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Abstract. Static oligopoly theories disagree on whether mergers are prof-
itable. The Cournot model says that many potential mergers would be unproﬁtable
whereas the Bertrand model says that all mergers are proﬁtable. We show that,
for economically sensible parameter values, mergers are proﬁtable for merging ﬁrms
when ﬁrms choose both price and output, using inventories to absorb diﬀerences
between output and sales. Furthermore, substantial cost advantages are necessary
for a merger to beneﬁt consumers. The merger predictions of our dynamic model
are most similar to predictions of static Bertrand analyses of diﬀerentiated products
even though our model often behaves like the Cournot model in the long run.
JEL CLASSIFICATION:
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1. Introduction
A major task of antitrust policy is the regulation of mergers. A merger allows partici-
pating ﬁrms to coordinate their actions and, presumably, increase proﬁts. This will harm
consumers to the extent that this coordination allows ﬁrms to raise prices and reduce
output, but it may beneﬁt consumers if cost savings from the merger are so large that
prices fall. Any discussion of antitrust policy requires an understanding of the impact of
mergers on consumer welfare and producer proﬁts. Despite the simple intuition, static
economic theory is ambiguous in its predictions. Cournot analysis argues that if a merger
does not reduce costs and does not nearly produce a monopoly, then the merging ﬁrms will
lose proﬁts. The Cournot view implies that regulators only need to prevent the formation
of monopolies and that ﬁrms would pursue a nonmonopolistic merger only if it reduced
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their costs. Bertrand analysis argues that ﬁrms will always be able to enhance market
power and proﬁts through merging and argues for more activist merger regulation. Sim-
ple static models fail to give us a clear analysis of mergers. We re-examine basic merger
questions using the dynamic model of oligopoly presented in Judd (1990), which allows
ﬁrms to choose both prices and output, using inventories to absorb diﬀerences between
output and sales. We ﬁnd that mergers are generally proﬁtable for participating ﬁrms in
the Judd (1990) model for empirically reasonable speciﬁcations of taste and technology.
The results from static oligopoly analysis follow directly from their simple static as-
sumptions. The intuitive view is supported by Bertrand-style analysis with diﬀerentiated
goods. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) showed that merged ﬁrms will increase prices on
their goods, and that the unmerged ﬁrms will follow by raising their prices, resulting in
higher proﬁts for all ﬁrms. Price increases in Bertrand competition are mutually beneﬁ-
cial, and mergers of any size are proﬁtable. In contrast, mergers are not always proﬁtable
in Cournot games. If ﬁrms merge in a Cournot oligopoly of a homogeneous good, then the
merged ﬁrm will want to reduce its output relative to the premerger total output. The
unmerged ﬁrms will respond by increasing their output, a response which reduces proﬁts
to the merged ﬁrm. In fact, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) conclude that mergers
involving fewer than 80% of the ﬁrms in the market are unproﬁtable. Thus, a potential
merger which does not reduce costs will not happen unless it nearly results in monopoly.
The key fact is that Bertrand analyses assume that ﬁrms set prices and immediately
adjust output to meet demand, whereas Cournot analyses assume that ﬁrms decide how
much to produce and then accept whatever price is necessary to sell that output. Their
s i m p l es t r u c t u r em a k es t a t i cm o d e l s 1 unsatisfactory for studying any oligopoly question,
particularly merger problems. They assume that ﬁrms may choose only price or quantity
whereas real ﬁrms choose both. Unfortunately, the results depend critically on which is
chosen by the ﬁrm and which is chosen by the market. Since real-world ﬁrms choose
both price and output, it is desirable to examine merger issues without making arbitrary
choices about strategic variables.
The pervasive ambiguities2 in static oligopoly theory has lead some to argue that one
1Some have examined an alternative, Stackelberg-like, approach which assumes that after a merger
the merged entity ﬁrst chooses its output recognizing the later reactions of the other ﬁrms. Farrell and
Shapiro(1990) and Gaudet and Salant(1991) use this approach. We stay with a dynamic Nash equilibrium
concept wherein all actions within a period are simultaneous but each ﬁrm’s actions today may aﬀect any
other ﬁrm’s actions tomorrow. Our dynamic game approach captures some of the ideas in conjectural
variations approaches but does so by explicitly modelling multiperiod interactions in a Nash equilibrium
approach.
2The ambiguity is an example of how models with strategic complements behave very diﬀerently
from models with strategic substitutes; see Bulow et al. (1985). This ambiguity is endemic in static
merger analysis. For example, Lommerud and Sorgard (1997) examines the proﬁtability of a merger if
the unmerged ﬁrms react by introducing new varieties. They ﬁnd that the Cournot and Bertrand models
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model of static oligopoly is better than the other. For example, Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) used a two-stage model where ﬁrms ﬁrst choose capacity and then choose prices.
The Kreps-Scheinkman model leads to the same outcomes as the Cournot model. How-
ever, even these results are fragile. The Kreps-Scheinkman game needs to specify rationing
rules since they do not allow inventories. Deneckere and Davidson (1986) show that the
equilibrium is sensitive to those rules.
We argue that it is ultimately futile to search for the best static model, and that
instead we should investigate merger questions in more realistic dynamic models. In
many industries, each ﬁrm decides the price at which it sells its products and how much
to produce each period, and uses inventories to absorb diﬀerences between current output
and current demand. Kirman and Sobel (1974) examined such a model, proving existence
of equilibrium under certain conditions. Judd (1990) presented a linear-quadratic model
with adjustment costs, investment, and learning. The addition of adjustment costs makes
quantities more diﬃcult to adjust than prices, a focus of the Kreps-Scheinkman (1983)
model. Judd (1990) examines only cases with linear-quadratic speciﬁcations of tastes
and technology, a choice we continue here. Since the inherently dynamic model in Judd
(1990) allows the ﬂexibility we see in many industries, we regard it as a more reasonable
description of reality than either static model.
It ﬁrst appears that this more complex model will be no more precise in its predictions.
Judd (1990) shows that long-run proﬁts, prices, and output replicate the static Cournot
model if the costs of adjustment are high. In these cases, any merger would reduce the
long-run proﬁts of merger partners. Judd (1990) also shows that if the costs of output
adjustment are low then the long- and short-run equilibria are essentially the Bertrand
equilibrium, implying that any merger increases the merged ﬁrms’ proﬁts immediately
and permanently. Therefore, the Judd (1990) model produces a mixture of the Bertrand
and Cournot results for long-run proﬁts and prices.
However, ﬁrms and consumers do not care only about the long-run. When ﬁrms con-
sider a merger, they presumably care about the present value of proﬁts, not the long-run
proﬁts. Also, the proper measure of the impact on consumers is the present value of con-
sumer surplus. When we take a present value approach, we ﬁnd surprisingly unambiguous
results for merger questions. For a broad range of parameter values, we ﬁnd that a merger
increases the present value of proﬁts for the merging ﬁrms, even in many cases where the
long-run steady-state equilibrium nearly equals the static Cournot equilibrium. Since the
static approach corresponds to a steady state analysis in our dynamic model, it is clearly
invalid in a dynamic world where producers and consumers care about the discounted
present value of proﬁts and utility.
Salant et al. and Davidson-Deneckere focus on mergers which don’t aﬀect costs. A
will be a mixture of complements and substitutes, and which eﬀects dominate depends on the parameters.Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 4
merger may be socially beneﬁcial if it allows ﬁrms to reduce their costs. The lack of
merger incentives in the Cournot model implies that if Cournot ﬁrms do merge short of
monopoly it must be because of cost savings. However, that is not true in the case of
Bertrand oligopolies. Froeb and Werden (1998) and Werden (1996) derive simple formulas
for determining how much cost reduction is required for a proﬁtable merger to not result
in a price increase. These papers are limited to the static Bertrand and Cournot models.
We reexamine this issue in our dynamic model.
This paper also uses a diﬀerent methodological approach than typically taken in the
industrial organization and antitrust policy literature. Because of the complexity of our
dynamic model, we cannot express dynamic equilibrium in compact formulas. Instead,
we use numerical methods to compare the pre- and post-merger dynamic equilibria. We
perform these computations over a broad and realistic range of values for the critical
demand and cost parameters. These calculations also produce evidence concerning the
quantitative importance of various factors. We argue that dozens of numerical examples
using realistic parameters in a realistic dynamic model and producing quantitative infor-
mation are more useful in analyzing real-world merger problems than theorems producing
qualitative results about unrealistic static models.
Our conclusions are limited by the special nature of the model but less so than is typical
in oligopoly analysis3 s i n c ei t sd y n a m i cd e t a i li sf a rm o r er e a l i s t i ct h a ns t a t i ca n a l y s e s .I n
general, this paper shows that adding realistic dynamic detail is both desirable and simple
to accomplish, and has substantial impact on the answers to important merger questions.
2. Dynamic Oligopoly with Inventories and Adjustment Costs
We use a multi-ﬁrm extension of the linear-quadratic duopoly model of diﬀerentiated
products with inventories developed in Judd (1990). Throughout this paper we assume
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where qi is consumption of good i, pi is the price of good i,a n dY is money income. We
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3Our analysis is limited to linear demand and cost structures, a limitation shared by much of the
literature. Crooke et al. (1999) emphasizes how the price change after a merger is sensitive to the
assumed functional forms in a Bertrand model. In particular, they ﬁnd that linear speciﬁcations predict
smaller price changes than many other speciﬁcations such as the constant elasticity form. A numerical
approach for nonlinear structures could be executed using the methods described in Judd(1992); we leave
those generalizations for future work.Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 5
loss of generality. The inverse demand functions are linear:




qj + C (2)
ψ ≡ 2(1+B(N − 1)), α ≡ 2(1 − B)
The demand for good i, di,i s












Note that C is the “choke price,” that is, if all products sold at price C then demand
for all goods is zero. The parameter B represents the degree of substitutability among
products. Products are perfect substitutes if B =0 . A sB increases, products are less
substitutable, and their demands are independent if B =1 . I fB exceeds 1 then the
products are complements. Since the analysis of complementary products would be sub-
stantially diﬀerent, and discussions of horizontal mergers typically focus on substitutable
products, we assume B lies between 0 and 1.
Substitutes Assumption: 0 <B<1
The key feature in Kirman-Sobel (1974) and Judd (1990) is the presence of inventories
which allow ﬁrms to choose price and output simultaneously. This speciﬁcation adds
substantial realism to the model. We follow Judd (1990) and assume adjustment costs in
production. The inventory of product i follows the rule
Ii,t+1 = φ (Ii,t + qi,t − di,t)( 4 )
where It,q t,d t represent beginning-of-period inventory, output, and demand in period t
respectively, and 1 − φ = δ ∈ [0,1] is the depreciation rate. In our model, demand is
determined by current prices only; hence, products are perishable for consumers, but
are somewhat durable as long as stored by ﬁrms. Therefore, given positive inventory
holding costs, each ﬁrm economizes on production and storage costs over time. We assume
quadratic inventory holding costs; the holding costs for product i are Hi(Ii)=hi Ii+giI2
i .
We assume a cost function for product i that includes adjustment costs. The cost of
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where mi is speciﬁct op r o d u c ti,a n dγ represents the common quantity adjustment
cost4. Adjustment costs aﬀect short-run marginal costs, but the long-run marginal cost
for product i is mi.
The quadratic adjustment cost in (5) models the realistic notion that it is costly
to change output quickly. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) appeal to adjustment costs to
justify their sequential game where quantities are chosen ﬁrst and prices second. However,
their game has only these two stages followed by one period of sales and output. The
game in Judd (1990) allows ﬁrms to simultaneously choose prices and quantities in each
period, and allows inventories to absorb diﬀerences between output and sales, and avoids
the rationing rules in Kreps-Scheinkman. The sequence of moves in this multi-period
dynamic game is a more realistic description of dynamic interaction. The extra ﬂexibility
in a dynamic game allows us to model the relative cost of adjusting output and prices in
a direct fashion instead of through careful construction of a simpler game. We assume
that adjustment cost terms are quadratic since the dynamic equilibrium is then relatively
easy to compute.
Let si,t denote the lagged output of product i, qi,t−1. The vector of state variables, yt,
is deﬁned by5
yt =[ 1 ,I 1,t,s 1,t,q 1,t,p 1,t,···IN,t,s N,t,q N,t,p N,t]  (6)
and the vector of control variables, xt,i sd e ﬁned by
xt =[ q1,t,p 1,t,···qN,t,p N,t] 
The state variables follow the linear law of motion
yt = ℵ yt−1 + g xt (7)
where ℵ and g are derived from (3,4) and the deﬁnitions for y and x. Current proﬁts
from product i are deﬁned by the demand and inverse demand systems (2,3) and can be
expressed in the quadratic form
πi(y)=pidi(p) − Ci(qi,s i) − Hi(Ii)=
1
2
y Ri y (8)
4We assume that γ is common in order to preserve the general symmetry of the problem. Heteroge-
neous γ would not aﬀect the tractability of the analysis. In order to focus on merger issues and possible
cost reductions, we assume symmetry in other aspects of problem, as is typical in this literature. The
speciﬁcation in (5) also assumes that long-run marginal cost is constant. We could add a niq2
i,t term to
model nonconstant long-run marginal costs, but we focus on the constant LRMC case to keep the analysis
simple and comparable to most papers in this literature. Furthermore, we are assuming that marginal
costs are constant only in the long run, a far more reasonable assumption than assuming constant short-
run marginal cost, the assumption implicit in static analyses which make no distinctions between the
short and long run.
5We follow the trick of including the constant 1 in the list of state variables. This allows us to express
proﬁts as a simple quadratic form. The equations of motion are augmented by y1,t+1 = y1,t and the
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These speciﬁcations deﬁne the structure of a linear-quadratic game.
2.1. Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium and Merger Analysis. We now describe
closed-loop Nash equilibrium and the exercise we perform to examine mergers. Each
ﬁrm (which may produce many products) chooses outputs and prices in each period to
maximize the present value of proﬁts. Since the deﬁnition of a ﬁrm will change with a
merger, we must include that possibility in our notation. We assume that there are M
products produced by N ≤ M ﬁrms. Let ω denote the product conﬁguration; speciﬁcally,
ﬁrm ω(i) produces product i.D e ﬁne Ωj(ω) to be the products produced by ﬁrm j in
product conﬁguration ω.L e txi =( qi,p i) denote output and price of product i,a n dl e t
Πj denote the proﬁt ﬂow for ﬁrm j.F i r mj’s proﬁts is a function of the state y as well as





The law of motion is (7) for any product conﬁguration.
For each product conﬁguration ω we have a linear-quadratic game. The value function
for ﬁrm j is deﬁned to be the present value of current and future proﬁts. The Bellman
equation (we follow here the indexing scheme used in Kydland (1975, 1977) where yt−1
is the state variable in the value function at time t)f o rﬁrm j when ω is the product
conﬁguration is
Vj(yt−1,ω,t)= m a x
xi,i∈Ωj(ω)
{Πj(yt,ω)+βVj(yt,ω,t+1 ) } (10)
s.t. yt = ℵ yt−1 + g xt
Our Bellman equation makes explicit the dependence of equilibrium proﬁts on the product
conﬁguration. The value function for each ﬁrm is speciﬁed diﬀerently depending upon the
market structure, the control variables and current proﬁts. When each ﬁrm produces a
single product, the controls for ﬁrm i are xi =( qi,p i)a n di t sp r o ﬁts are Πi = πi.W e
take this to be the pre-merger equilibrium. If all ﬁrms were to merge the result would be
as i n g l eﬁrm which would have a monopoly over the N goods.
Firms are no longer symmetric if some of them merge. If ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 merge,
then the new merged entity controls the variables (q1,p 1,q 2,p 2) and competes with ﬁrms
which sell only one product. The proﬁt function for the merged ﬁrm will be the sum of π1
and π2 but π1 and/or π2 may be diﬀerent due to the merger because of cost savings from
joint production. Formally, we allow costs to depend on the product conﬁguration. We
assume that technology transfers are free within a ﬁrm, and therefore free among merged
ﬁrms. Thus, it is crucial how we specify the form of (joint) cost functions for a merger6.
6See, for examples of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, Perry and Porter[1985] or Farrell and Shapiro[1990].Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 8
If technologies are identical over ﬁrms and have no scale eﬀects, a merger will produce no
cost-savings.
We can compute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for any product conﬁguration
since we have assumed linear-quadratic utility and cost functions. We examine two simple
cases, following standard merger analysis. We assume that we begin with N ﬁrms each
producing a single product. After a merger of M ﬁrms, we have a non-cooperative game
among N − M + 1 entities: one merged ﬁrm selling M products and N − M unmerged
independent ﬁrms selling a single product. By comparing the solution of this game with
the solution of the initial non-cooperative game among N ﬁrms, we can provide possible
answers to the questions about the proﬁtability and social value of mergers.
We need to be clear about the dynamic details of the analysis. The critical features
are: (i) the N single-product ﬁrms converge to the steady-state of the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium before the merger occurs; (ii) there is an unanticipated merger of some
of the ﬁrms; (iii) any cost saving among the merged ﬁrms is achieved immediately and
permanently; and, (iv) ﬁrms proceed under the assumption that there will be no further
mergers. To do this we compute the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies and value
functions for two product conﬁgurations: the pre-merger case of single-product ﬁrms and
the post-merger product conﬁguration. We compute the changes in the present value of
consumer and producer surplus, evaluated at the pre-merger steady state which occur
as a result of the unanticipated merger and use these values to judge the impact of the
merger on consumer and producer surplus.
2.2. Computational Details. We have speciﬁed a general linear-quadratic dynamic
game. There are no closed-form solutions for the equilibrium of the inﬁnite-horizon dy-
namic game. This is not surprising since there are no closed-form solutions for multivariate
linear-quadratic control problems, which require the solution a Ricatti equation. There
are some eigenvalue-eigenvector solution methods for LQ control problems which reduce
the numerical problem to familiar matrix algebra operations, but our dynamic game is not
the solution to a single optimal control problem, but the solution to interactions among
the individual control problems. The absence of a closed-form solution makes it unlikely
that we can prove theorems telling us when mergers are proﬁtable, increase consumer sur-
plus, or increase social surplus. There are closed-form solutions for ﬁnite horizon games
given a terminal payoﬀ. In fact, we will use them in our computations below. However,
they are the result of hundreds of iterations of linear operations and would be impossible
to even just display in this paper. They are also useless for proving theorems on the
impact of mergers. We must resort to computation in order to address these issues in a
quantitative fashion. In fact, our computations show that there are no simple theorems
since we ﬁnd examples covering a broad range of possibilities. The only way to proceed
is to compute equilibria for empirically sensible cases, and ﬁnd instructive patterns forMergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 9
those cases.
Fortunately, it is relatively easy to compute the equilibrium value functions for each
conﬁguration of ﬁrms and products. A linear-quadratic dynamic game reduces to a cou-
pled system of Bellman’s equations where each ﬁrm-speciﬁc Bellman equation is an opti-
mal linear regulator problem. We obtain the subgame perfect solution (also known as the
feedback solution and Markov Perfect equilibrium) numerically by recursive, backwards
computation beginning with a concave terminal value functions for the ﬁrms. That is, we
make a guess about the ﬁrms’ value functions at some terminal time T, then compute the
value functions at time T − 1, T − 2, T − 3, etc. We iterate backwards for 500 periods;
we ﬁnd that the 500-period solution is indistinguishable from the 400-period solution and
insensitive to the guess for the terminal value. The resulting collection of policy and value
functions describe ﬁrm behavior during any transition period as well as at the steady
state. This computation must be done for both the pre-merger dynamic game as well as
any of the post-merger dynamic games we study.
The details of computing the dynamic oligopoly equilibrium are spelled out in the
literature; see, for example, Basar and Olsder (1995) and Kydland (1975, 1977) for precise
descriptions of the linear algebra used to compute the equilibrium value and strategy
functions at time t given the value functions at time t + 1. We will illustrate the ideas
behind the computational technique by presenting the details for the simpler case of
duopoly.
The solution to Vj(y,ω,t), the value function for ﬁrm j at time t in state y and
product conﬁguration ω,7 takes the form of coupled Ricatti equations. The solution to Vj
is a quadratic form
Vj(yt−1,ω,t)=( 1 /2)y 
t−1Sj,t yt−1













Σj,t = Rt + βSj, t+1,j=1 , 2 (12)
Let xj,t denote the set of prices and outputs under the control of ﬁrm j in the product
conﬁguration ω. Given the value function at t +1 ,( 1 /2)y 
tSj,t+1 yt, ﬁrm 1 chooses the
variables under its control, x1,t, to solve the Bellman equation (10), implying the ﬁrst-
order condition
0=g 
1Σ1,tg1x1,t + g 
1Σ1,tg2x2,t + g 
1Σ1,tℵyt−1 (13)
7The product conﬁguration for a duopoly is either one product per ﬁrm or a single ﬁrm controlling
both products. We keep the ω notation since it is necessary in the cases we compute.Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 10
First-order conditions for ﬁrm 2 imply the symmetric condition
0=g 
2Σ2,tg2x2,t + g 
2Σ2,tg1x1,t + g 
2Σ2,tℵyt−1 (14)
If we combine the ﬁrst-order conditions in (13,14), we ﬁnd that the equilibrium rule is
xt = Gtyt−1
where
Gt =( HtB)−1Htℵ (15)
Furthermore, the quadratic form for the value function at t is
Sj,t =( ℵ + gGt) Σj,t(ℵ + gGt)
The equations (11,12,15) form a recursive set of matrix equations which take us from
the t+1 value functions represented in the Sj,t+1 matrices to the period t value functions
represented in the Si,t matrices. If period T were the last period and Sj,T were ﬁrm j’s
ﬁnal payoﬀ,t h e nw ec a nc o m p u t et h ep a y o ﬀ for periods t<Tby iterating the process in
(11,12,15). For any time t<Twe can combine these expressions to produce a closed-form
solution for Sj,t but the result is of no value for our purposes. Therefore, we compute
several examples.
Any computation is an approximation, so we need to examine their likely quality.
Standard diagnostics indicate that the numerically computed equilibria for these cases are
quite reliable. In every simulation, we found that the condition numbers of the matrices
which arise in our computations are quite small. In particular, these log condition numbers
always fall between 2 and 4, indicating that we lose at most 4 decimal digits (out of the
16 digits which our computer can carry) in critical matrix operations. Also, the ﬁrst ﬁve
digits of the results were insensitive to changes in the horizon and large changes in the
terminal value function. These diagnostics indicate that our numerical results are good
approximations to the inﬁnite-horizon equilibrium to at least a few signiﬁcant digits, an
accuracy which is adequate for our purposes.
There is one detail about which we must be careful. This procedure uses just the ﬁrst-
order conditions for the players’ optimization problems. It may produce value functions
for a player which are not concave in that players’ control variables, in which case the
decision rules do not satisfy the second-order conditions for optimization. For example,
this could arise if there were signiﬁcant increasing returns to scale in a ﬁrm’s production
function. Our examples do not have increasing returns to scale in output. We sometimes
allow mergers to have a spillover eﬀect on costs, but that does not produce an increasing
returns to scale since all ﬁrms have constant returns to scale with respect to output both
before and after the merger. We have checked our examples and ﬁnd that decision rules
in our equilibria satisfy the second-order conditions for optimization and that solutionsMergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 11
to the ﬁrst-order conditions are unique at each stage. Therefore, all of our equilibria are
unique.8
2.3. Limitations and Possible Extensions. There are many limitations of this
analysis. First, we have made special functional form assumptions concerning demand
and supply; however, this is not a weakness unique to this analysis. Crooke et al. (1997)
show that the predictions for the price eﬀects of mergers in the typical static model are
sensitive to functional form speciﬁcations. We are sure that many of our quantitative
results would also be sensitive to changes in the demand speciﬁcation, However, it is
unclear if the case of linear demand and supply substantially biases the qualitative results
in any particular direction. In any case, extending our analysis to nonlinear cost and
demand structures is well beyond the scope of this paper since it would require the solution
of nonlinear dynamic games. The numerical methods presented in Judd (1992) could be
used to analyze more general speciﬁcations, but we leave this for future work.
Second, we have ignored entry. The possibility of entry will aﬀect merger decisions
since entry may blunt the incentive of incumbents to merge and their ability to exploit
any market power. This has been the focus of papers such as Kamien and Zang (1990),
Werden and Froeb (1998), and Gowrisankaran (1999). Those studies have stayed with
conventional Bertrand or Cournot modes of competition. Nonlinear extensions of our
model could allow both price and output decisions by ﬁr m sa sw e l la se n t r y ,b u tt h e yl i e
beyond the scope of this study.
2.4. Cases Examined. We compute the impact of mergers for several cases. We now
list those cases and indicate why these represent a broad range of empirically reasonable
cases.
We compute equilibria of markets with N =5 , 7 and 10 products. The long-run
marginal cost for product i, mi, may vary across products and may be aﬀected by a
merger. We assume ﬁrm 1 has the best technology with LRMC equal to m1,a n dt h a t
it is involved in any merger. The pre-merger marginal cost for all products other than
product 1 is m−1.
We assume no depreciation of inventories, that is, δ = 0; some experimentation shows
that this does not aﬀect our results. The inventory cost parameters are chosen to be
hi =0 ,g i =1 ,10, and 100, for all i. Our tables below will report on the case g =1 0 0 , a
quadratic cost function with very steep curvature and an optimal steady state inventory
level close to zero. Supplementary calculations indicate that the results do not depend on
8This uniqueness property would disappear if we allowed an inﬁnite horizon since the folk theorem
implies that there could be reputation-style equilibria as well as the ones we approximate. The objective
of this paper is to examine the implications of long but ﬁnite horizon games with the implications of
static analyses. Therefore, we do not examine reputation equilibria.Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 12
this. Also, no result is aﬀected by h since h just aﬀects the optimal inventory level9.
The adjustment cost parameter, γ,i sa s s u m e dt ob e0 ,5,50, or 500, so that the exam-
ples cover the cases ranging from the case of no adjustment cost to cases with expensive
and slow output adjustment. There is little point examining cases where γ > 500 since the
adjustment costs become unrealistically large. It is not immediately apparent what values
γ should have. Fortunately, γ is closely related to the slope of the short-run marginal cost
curve. We will use the implied values for short-run marginal costs to judge what γ should
be.
We assume C = 100; this is arbitrary since long-run marginal costs are constant. The
substitutability parameter, B, is critical; we allow it to range between 0.1a n d0 .5. We
will see that this range encompasses sensible values for own- and cross-price elasticities.
The discount factor, β,i ss e tt ob e0 .99; this corresponds to setting a unit of time equal
to three months if the annual interest rate is 4%.
The complete list of critical parameter values used in our calculations are listed in Table
1. Our discussion below will present the results for some of these values to indicate the
magnitudes of various eﬀects. We will also provide statements summarizing the qualitative
patterns found in the complete collection of computations.
[PUT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
While this set of parameters is somewhat limiting, it focuses on economically sen-
sible cases. We will see that the range for B covers sensible values for own- and cross-
elasticities of demand, and the range for γ covers sensible values for the short-run elasticity
of marginal cost. We make no eﬀort to use estimated elasticity values for any particular
industry; instead we choose values for the critical parameters which are plausible. Increas-
ing the range of values will not aﬀect the qualitative ﬁndings much since we ﬁnd some
ambiguities even with this range of values. The key fact is that our calculations can show
how the results depend on demand and cost elasticities and the reader can ultimately
judge what is plausible and what is not.
2.5. Qualitative Results. We next note some qualitative features of equilibrium that
help us understand our results. First, when there are no adjustment costs (γ =0 )t h e
dynamic equilibrium for the ﬁnite-horizon game is the same as the Bertrand equilibrium
and the Bertrand equilibrium is an equilibrium of the inﬁnite-horizon game. This hap-
pens because both short- and long-run marginal costs are constant when γ = 0. With no
adjustment costs, current output aﬀects neither current nor future marginal cost. Further-
more, unexpected movements in inventory are immediately neutralized in the following
9This is true also because we assume constant long-run marginal cost. If LRMC were not constant
then the long-run level of output would be aﬀected by a merger, aﬀecting the LRMC and the marginal
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period without any eﬀect on marginal cost. Price decisions aﬀect only demand since any
inventory implications of a price decision are absorbed by a change in output without
aﬀecting marginal cost. Therefore, there is no strategic value to inventories and output
decisions focus on maintaining a target level of inventory. Therefore, pricing decisions are
the same as in the static Bertrand equilibrium, and output is set to supply anticipated
demand and maintain the eﬃcient level of inventory.
Second, as the adjustment cost parameter γ increases, the slope of short-run marginal
cost curve gets steeper and our dynamic model incorporates some of the capacity-commitment
or quantity-setting features of static Cournot games. The steady state of the oligopoly
when all ﬁrms have very large adjustment costs has nearly the same output and prices as
a static Cournot equilibrium. These cases resemble the Kreps-Scheinkman model since
Kreps-Scheinkman implicitly assume that the ex post cost of capacity adjustment is inﬁ-
nite.
Judd (1990) demonstrated these results for the case of two ﬁrms. Our analysis is more
general since we analyze multiﬁrm oligopolies but we ﬁnd these same basic qualitative
results. Since the parameter γ parameterizes the transition from Bertrand oligopoly to
Cournot oligopoly, we might expect a comparable mixture of results for merger analysis.
However, the steady-state results in our dynamic model are not relevant since convergence
to the steady state is very slow when adjustment costs are large. In dynamic economics
in general, we know that comparative steady state analysis is highly questionable, par-
ticularly as part of welfare analysis. In our dynamic model, the net result is much less
ambiguous than static analyses.
3. Mergers with no Cost Saving
We ﬁr s te x a m i n et h ec a s ew h e r ea l lﬁrms have the same costs, both before and after any
merger. Our computations display several robust properties. We illustrate them in Figure
1 for the case of a two-product merger in a ﬁve-product industry when m =3 0 ,B=0 .1,
and γ = 500. This is a case where the products are good substitutes and adjustment costs
are very high. The steady state of this case is indistinguishable from the static Cournot
model. This case is a rather extreme one but gives us rich example of what may happen
in equilibrium.
Figure 1a displays the per-product output for both the merged and unmerged ﬁrms.
Equilibrium converges slowly to the steady state because of the high value of γ. The un-
merged ﬁrms continuously expand their output and the merged ﬁrm continuously reduces
its output of each product, as would be predicted by a Cournot model. Figure 1b displays
product prices. All unmerged ﬁrms gradually increase their prices over pre-merger levels,
as predicted by Bertrand analysis. The merged ﬁrm has a humped pattern for prices, ﬁrst
raising prices then retreating somewhat before settling in to a steady state with higher
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Figure 1c displays per-period proﬁts. The evolution of proﬁts is even more com-
plex. The proﬁts of the unmerged ﬁrms immediately increase above pre-merger levels and
continue to rise forever. In this case, the merged ﬁrms’ proﬁts immediately falls below
pre-merger levels but then rises above pre-merger levels, only to ultimately fall below
pre-merger levels. This is one of the few cases where the merged ﬁrms lose in terms of
present value, but the hump-shaped pattern in proﬁts is seen often. In the short-run the
merged ﬁrms absorb high adjustment costs to get output down. In the intermediate run,
the unmerged ﬁrms have not yet attained their long-run market share and the merged
ﬁrm extract extra proﬁts by coordinating the output and pricing of its products. Firms
may want to merge even though the resulting market power is temporary. In contrast,
the traditional static approach would argue that a merger would not be desired since it
implicitly only examines the steady state. Figure 1d tracks consumer, producer, and so-
cial surplus. This merger produces a growing transfer from consumers to producers. The
net eﬀect on social surplus was slightly negative.
[PUT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The humped pattern for the merged ﬁrms’ proﬁts in Figure 1d was seen in several
examples we plotted, even for some proﬁtable mergers. Sometimes, the initial eﬀect on
the merged ﬁrms’ proﬁts is sometimes negative, even though there is a present value gain.
The intuition for the overshooting pattern is clear. The intermediate gains in proﬁts occur
because it takes time for the unmerged ﬁrms to increase their output; in the meantime,
the merged ﬁrm also cuts back on output but in a coordinated fashion across the products
it sells, as in a Bertrand analysis.
3.1. Proﬁts. We now focus on the impact of mergers on proﬁts. Tables 2 and 3 display
our results for the impact of a merger on the present value of proﬁts. They report the
percentage proﬁt gain per product for the ﬁr m si n v o l v e di nam e r g e r ;e . g . ,t h eﬁrst row
of Table 2 tells us that if four ﬁrms merge then the proﬁts for the four-product ﬁrm will
be 39.5% greater than the joint proﬁts of the four pre-merger ﬁrms. We assume m =3 0 ;
the results are practically identical for m =2 0 ,40, and so are not reported here. In
these tables, we see that larger mergers are more beneﬁcial for the participating ﬁrms. As
expected, γ is negatively related with the proﬁtability measure. When the model collapses
to a Bertrand game (γ =0 )ﬁrms instantly move to steady-state prices and adjust out
mergers of any size are proﬁtable, as predicted by the Bertrand approach to mergers.
With γ =0 ,ﬁrms can instantly set the new steady state levels of price and quantity,
which makes our dynamic model equivalent to a static Bertrand game.
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As γ increases, the importance of transition periods also increases. The steady states
when γ = 500 almost equal the static Cournot equilibria. Many cases with high γ imply a
reduction in steady state proﬁts, as with the static Cournot model, but imply an increase
in the present value of proﬁts. This is the key reason why we ﬁnd far more proﬁtable
mergers than static Cournot analysis does.
W h e t h e ro rn o tt h em e r g e dﬁrms beneﬁt from a merger depends on the parameter val-
ues. In general, the merged ﬁrms enjoy an increase in the present value of their combined
proﬁts. The only exceptions in Tables 2 and 3 are mergers of two ﬁrms with B =0 .1,
γ =5 0i nt h eﬁve-product industry, and mergers of two and three ﬁrms with B =0 .1,
γ = 50, merger of two ﬁrms with B =0 .2, and γ = 50 in the ten-product industry. Thus,
partial market concentration is less likely to be proﬁtable when products are close sub-
stitutes and ﬁrms are less able to change output. This is similar to the extreme case
of homogeneous products in the traditional static Cournot game, such as in Salant et
al.(1983).
Table 2 also reports the elasticities of short-run marginal cost in the pre-merger steady
states. The elasticity of marginal cost is deﬁned as the percentage increase of marginal
cost caused by one percent increase of output quantity, and reﬂects the slope of marginal
cost curve. This elasticity gives us a way to judge what are plausible values for γ.T h ec a s e
where a two-product merger was unproﬁtable also had a SRMC elasticity of nearly ten,
implying that a 1% increase in output over one unit of time would increase marginal cost
by nearly ten per cent. This is where our choice of β = .99 is important. Since safe assets
return about 1% (after inﬂation) and risky assets like equity return about 7%, this implies
that the period of time we use is at least two months and could be up to twelve months,
depending on a ﬁrm’s cost of capital. Given the fact that output is far more volatile than
prices, elasticities of SRMC greater than ten appear to be, at best, marginally plausible.
Cases with γ = 500 more often produce Cournot-like implications for proﬁt gains but also
imply implausible elasticities of SRMC on the order of 100. Therefore, these examples are
not supportive of using static Cournot models for merger analysis since it implies extreme
properties of the cost function.
While unproﬁtable mergers are possible, they seem to require unrealistically inﬂexible
cost functions. Of course, in examining an actual merger, one could estimate the short-run
elasticities to evaluate likely proﬁtability. In any case, the reader can examine Tables 2
and 3 and judge for themselves whether the cases with Cournot-like results are plausible.
We next summarize our results from Tables 2 and 3 and our complete set of computations.
Summary 1. For the parameter values displayed in Table 1, mergers with no cost savings
increase the present value of proﬁts for the participants except when quantity adjustment
costs are large, the products are good substitutes, and the number of merged ﬁrms is
small. When adjustment costs are large, steady state proﬁts for the merged ﬁrms mayMergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 16
fall even when the present value of proﬁts increases.
3.2. Consumer and Social Surplus. Consumers surely lose from mergers when
there are no cost savings, and social surplus will fall because of the rise in prices and fall
in output. Tables 4 and 5 report the changes in consumer and social surplus from various
mergers. They show that consumer losses from mergers are greater when adjustment costs
are higher. This is because the initial pre-merger steady state has lower output and is
less eﬃcient as γ increases and any merger aggravates that ineﬃciency. Tables 4 and 5
show that social surplus losses are small unless the merger involves most of the products.
Tables 4 and 5 assume that the constant marginal cost is m = 30; since the results are
expressed in percentages, they are nearly the same for m =2 0 , 40; therefore, we display
only the m =3 0c a s e .
The dependence on B is ambiguous. Mergers aﬀect output and prices if B  =1 .W h e n
B = 1, product demands are independent and mergers have no impact on anything.
Similarly, the case B = 0 and γ = 0 reduces to Bertrand competition among perfect
substitutes, wherein price always equals marginal cost and any merger which does not
lead to monopoly has no impact on price, proﬁts, or total output. Therefore, mergers
short of monopoly reduce consumer and social surplus for intermediate values of B but
not for the extreme cases.
Tables 4 and 5 also show that surplus changes depend intuitively on M,t h en u m b e ro f
merged ﬁrms. The loss is convex in M, implying that larger mergers are disproportionately
bad for consumers and society. This is expected since a couple of ﬁrms which merge
have little additional market power but that the marginal ability to collude increases as
more competitors are eliminated. This corresponds to the standard static result that the
eﬃciency cost of oligopoly is (roughly) inversely proportional to the square of the number
of competitors.
[PUT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE]
We next summarize the results from Tables 4 and 5 and our complete set of compu-
tations.
Summary 2. For the parameter values displayed in Table 1, consumer and social surplus
are reduced by mergers. The loss is convex in the number of merged ﬁrms. The loss is
greatest for goods with intermediate substitutability.
4. Mergers with Cost Savings
If a merger reduces, there will be a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency gains and market con-
centration. To study this trade-oﬀ, we examine mergers where one ﬁrm with a superior
technology merges with other ﬁrms, allowing the merged ﬁrm to use the low-cost tech-
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technology initially. Such a merger will have ambiguous eﬀects. First, the merged entity
raises the price of good 1 due to market concentration. Second, it may reduce the price
of the other goods sold by the merged entity due to cost reductions. We will see that the
critical determinants are various elasticities, the size of the eﬃciency gain, and the size of
merger.
We examine these issues using the same model and basic parameters as before, except
that m1, ﬁrm (and product) 1’s long-run average and marginal cost, diﬀers from the
other ﬁrms’ cost, which we denote m−1. We examine cost reductions of 10% and 30%,
representing a small and large cost reduction. We computed equilibria for the parameter
values in Table 1 and ﬁnd that cases with diﬀerent parameter values and cost savings can
be inferred by interpolating the results we report in tables.
4.1. Proﬁts. When mergers reduce costs, proﬁts for the merger partners should rise
by more than when there are no cost savings. The proﬁts for product 1 do not always
increase, since it loses its monopoly of the low-cost technology as Firm 1 merges with
other ﬁrms. We found several small merger cases where the proﬁts from product 1 falls.
However, the costs of producing the products other than product 1 are reduced, and the
merged ﬁrm gains from both increased eﬃciency and market concentration. Ignoring the
distribution problem within a merger, we look at the total proﬁt for the merged ﬁrm
relative to their pre-merger ﬁrms.
Tables 6 and 7 report the change in proﬁts for the merged ﬁrm relative to the total
proﬁts of its pre-merger ﬁrms. Tables 6 and 7 presents the case of a 10% cost reduction.
Table 6 reports pre-merger demand and cost elasticities to indicate the reasonability of
the examples. The elasticities are averages over the pre-merger ﬁrms in the N =5c a s e ;a n
average is necessary since the asymmetry in costs imply asymmetric pre-merger equilibria.
Again we ﬁnd that our choices for B and γ bracket a wide range of economically plausible
demand and cost elasticities. We do not repeat this for the N = 10 case since there are
few diﬀerences. We see that the proﬁt gains from mergers are substantial in all cases, and
that there are no cases in Tables 6 and 7 where proﬁts fall. Even a 10% cost advantage
of a merger wiped out the possibility of losses in the cases where mergers lost money in
Tables 4 and 5.
[PUT TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE]
We next summarize the results from our complete set of computations.
Summary 3. For all the parameter values displayed in Table 1, mergers are proﬁtable
for merger participants when m1 <. 9m−1. The proﬁt gains are greater for larger mergers,
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4.2. Consumer and Social Surplus. The cost savings from a merger will reduce
the total costs of production. The key welfare issue is whether this gain is enough to
overcome the increase in market power and lead to lower consumer prices. To examine
this we compute the change in present values of consumer surplus and social surplus due to
the merger. Tables 8 and 9 report the percentage change in the present value of consumer
and social surplus after a merger relative to the pre-merger steady state.
[PUT TABLES 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE]
The results are robust across the ﬁve- and ten-product cases, and also represent the
results for other choices of N. First, Tables 8 and 9 show that consumers suﬀer from
mergers unless the cost savings are large or the market concentration of the merged ﬁrm
is small. Even when the cost savings are 30%, consumer surplus falls when two out of
ﬁve ﬁrms merge. Consumers beneﬁt only when a few ﬁrms out of several merge, such as
in Table 9 where there are initially ten ﬁrms. Consumers also suﬀer more as γ increases.
This is because larger γ means that the ﬁrms are playing more of a Cournot game in the
long run and that the merged ﬁrm takes less advantage of its cost advantage.
Second, the implications for social surplus are more benign. Social surplus includes
the proﬁts of the unmerged ﬁrms as well as the consumer surplus and the merged ﬁrms’
proﬁts. The unmerged ﬁrms gain when there are no cost savings, but they may lose when
the merger reduces costs. The merged products with lower costs are now more competitive
and may take sales from the unmerged ﬁrms. Mergers are often socially beneﬁcial when
γ = 0 since then our dynamic model reduces to a static Bertrand game where equilibrium
prices are close to production costs. As γ increases, the social surplus losses from mergers
are greater.
Third, the relation between social surplus and the size of mergers is not monotone.
In particular, Table 9 shows that there is often a nontrivial merger that maximizes social
surplus. For example, when N =1 0 ,aﬁve-product merger enhances social surplus more
than the other mergers displayed when B =0 .2a n dγ = 0, but a three-ﬁrm merger is
best when γ = 50.
Fourth, we see most mergers still reduce social surplus unless cost savings are large.
With large cost savings, even a monopoly may be desirable if that is the only way for
the superior technology to diﬀuse. Comparing these tables with Tables 6 and 7, we
found all the mergers that beneﬁt consumers also enhance social surplus. Mergers always
involve some redistribution since we found no Pareto-improving mergers. The reason is
that unmerged ﬁrms suﬀer a loss in proﬁts whenever consumers gain. In this model,
consumers and the merger’s competitors have opposite interests.
We now summarize the results from Tables 8 and 9, and our complete set of compu-
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Summary 4. For the parameter values displayed in Table 1, mergers can increase social
surplus when cost savings are nontrivial, but consumers gain only when cost savings are
large, the merged ﬁrms have small market share, and/or the game is nearly a Bertrand
game. A nontrivial merger is often better for social surplus than no merger, but monopoly
is not best except for very large cost savings.
5. Conclusions
The analysis of mergers in oligopolistic markets is critical to the formation of rational
antitrust policy. We use the Judd (1990) model of dynamic oligopoly to address merger
questions. This model avoids the unrealistic strategic limitations of Cournot and Bertrand
analysis, and allows for costly output adjustment in the short run. Static Cournot and
Bertrand models diﬀer in their predictions of ﬁrms’ incentives to merge. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms
generally beneﬁt from mergers. This agrees with the conclusions of the Bertrand analysis
in Deneckere and Davidson (1985), but disagrees with the Cournot analysis of Salant et
al.(1983). We show that the Cournot analysis of mergers is unreliable in predicting merger
proﬁtability in dynamic contexts even in cases where the static Cournot model correctly
predicts the long-run equilibrium. The diﬀerence arises because we focus on the present
value of merger activity whereas the Cournot model implicitly focuses on the long-run
steady state of our model.
While this analysis is limited, it does show that dynamic analysis of mergers can
be executed. It oﬀers an alternative to using unrealistic static models which produce
conﬂicting results. Most surprising, we show that much of the ambiguity and confusion
of static analyses is avoided by examining a more realistic, explicitly dynamic model.Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 20
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6. Tables
Table 1: Cases Examined
Tastes: B ∈ {.05,.10,.20,.30,.50,.75},C=1 0 0 , β = .99
LRMC: m ∈ {20,30,40},m −1 ∈ {m,.9m,.8m,.7m}
Adjustment Cost: γ ∈ {0,5,50,500}
Inventory costs: g ∈ {1,10,100},h=0
Products: N ∈ {5,7,10}
Table 2: Proﬁt Gains (%) and Elasticities
No Cost Savings: N =5 ,m=3 0
ProﬁtG a i n s Pre-merger
for M = Demand Elas. Elas. of
B γ 234 Own- Cross- SRMC
0.1 5 2.0 13.2 39.5 5.5 1.2 1.0
0.1 50 -1.4 7.3 29.8 5.9 1.3 9.7
0.2 5 2.0 8.7 22.3 3.4 0.7 0.9
0.2 50 0.5 6.0 17.8 3.6 0.7 9.0
0.5 5 0.5 2.0 4.5 2.2 0.3 0.7
0.5 50 0.4 1.7 4.0 2.3 0.3 7.4
Table 3: ProﬁtG a i n s( % )
No Cost Savings: N =1 0 ,m=3 0
B γ M =2 3 5 9
0.1 0 1.0 3.5 14.2 103.0
0.1 5 0.5 2.6 13.1 92.4
0.1 50 -1.4 -0.9 7.1 79.0
0.2 0 0.7 2.3 8.9 48.7
0.2 5 0.5 2.0 8.5 45.2
0.2 50 -0.1 0.9 6.5 40.2
0.5 0 0.2 0.5 2.0 8.23
0.5 5 0.1 0.5 1.9 8.1
0.5 50 0.1 0.4 1.8 7.6Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 23
Table 4: Post-Merger Surplus Changes (%)
No Cost Savings: N =5 , m =3 0
Consumer Surplus Social Surplus
B γ M= 234 M= 234
0.1 5 -4.9 -14.3 -30.9 -0.78 -2.85 -7.62
0.1 50 -6.6 -17.9 -35.3 -1.22 -4.07 -9.71
0.3 5 -4.6 -13.8 -28.7 -1.10 -3.72 -8.77
0.3 50 -5.5 -15.6 -30.1 -1.39 -4.42 -9.54
Table 5: Post-Merger Surplus Changes (%)
























Table 6: Proﬁt Gains (%) and Elasticities: N =5
ProﬁtG a i n s Average Pre-merger
for M = Demand Elas. Elas. of
m1 m−1 B γ 234 Own- Cross- SRMC
18 20 0.1 5 92 24 8 3.6 0.8 1.9
18 20 0.1 50 51 53 7 3.9 0.8 18.3
18 20 0.3 5 51 01 8 2.0 0.3 1.6
18 20 0.3 50 59 1 6 2.1 0.3 15.4
36 40 0.1 5 19 34 60 7.0 1.5 0.7
36 40 0.1 50 14 26 48 7.5 1.6 7.3
36 40 0.3 5 12 18 27 3.5 0.6 0.6
36 40 0.3 50 11 17 24 3.6 0.6 6.0Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 24
Table 7: ProﬁtG a i n s( % )f o rM e r g e r s :
N =1 0 , m1 =3 0 ,m−1 =2 7
B γ M= 2346 9
0.1 5 16.6 23.7 29.3 45.1 112.2
0.1 50 13.6 18.3 22.2 35.7 97.0
0.2 5 10.6 15.1 18.7 28.1 58.3
0.2 50 9.8 13.6 16.7 25.1 52.8
0.5 5 5.9 8.1 9.5 11.9 16.8
0.5 50 5.8 8.0 9.3 11.6 16.3
Table 8: Post-Merger (%) Changes in Surplus: N =5
Consumer Surplus Social Surplus
m1 m−1 B γ M =2 3 M =2 3
18 20 0.1 5 -4.34 -13.4 -0.01 -1.41
18 20 0.1 50 -6.11 -17.1 -0.52 -2.76
18 20 0.3 5 -3.89 -12.6 -0.21 -2.02
18 20 0.3 50 -4.87 -14.4 -0.53 -2.76
14 20 0.1 5 -3.29 -11.6 1.61 1.49
14 20 0.1 50 -5.26 -15.6 0.92 -0.12
14 20 0.3 5 -2.44 -10.1 1.61 1.43
14 20 0.3 50 -3.53 -12.0 1.24 0.59
28 40 0.1 5 -0.74 -7.3 5.95 8.76
28 40 0.1 50 -3.21 -12.0 4.69 6.35
28 40 0.3 5 1.19 -3.7 6.32 10.15
28 40 0.3 50 -0.18 -6.2 5.78 9.04Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 25
Table 9: Post-Merger (%) Changes in Surplus















M =2 3 4 5
0.4 0.1 -0.8 -2.6
-0.9 -3.0 -6.2 -10.5
0.1 -0.6 -2.2 -5.1
-0.8 -2.9 -6.2 -10.7
0.1 -0.7 -2.4 -5.1
-0.2 -1.4 -3.6 -6.6
2.0 3.2 3.4 2.5
0.2 -1.2 -3.8 -7.7
1.7 2.4 1.9 0.02
0.5 -0.6 -3.1 -6.8
1.7 2.4 2.0 0.6
1.4 1.5 0.7 -1.3
Social Surplus
M = 234 5
0.8 1.6 2.1 2.5
0.6 0.8 0.6 0.0
0.8 1.3 1.6 1.7
0.5 0.7 0.4 -0.2
0.6 1.1 1.2 1.0
0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4
3.1 5.8 8.0 9.8
2.4 4.0 5.0 5.5
2.7 5.0 7.0 8.5
2.3 4.1 5.2 5.8
2.4 4.6 6.3 7.7
2.3 4.3 5.8 7.0Mergers and Dynamic Oligopoly 26
7. Figures
Figure 1: Impact of a merger